Online Proceedings
Working Paper No. 45/08

Inaugural Conference, Geneva, July 15-17, 2008

HOW HARD AND SOFT LAW INTERACT IN INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE : ALTERNATIVES,
COMPLEMENTS AND ANTAGONISTS
Gregory C. Shaffer
Melvin C. Steen Professor of Law
University of Minnesota Law School
Mark A. Pollack
Associate Professor, Political Science
Temple University

July 8, 2008
Published by the Society of International
Economic Law
with the support of the University of MissouriKansas City (UMKC) School of Law

This paper can be downloaded free of charge
from:
http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-InauguralConference.html

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156867

Draft 7/8/2008

How Hard and Soft Law Interact in International Regulatory Governance:
Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists

by Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack1

There has been a considerable amount of legal scholarship regarding the use of
“hard” and “soft” law in international governance, written from legal positivist,
normative and political economy perspectives. Within the legal academy, hard law
generally refers to legal obligations of a formally binding nature and soft law to law that
is not formally binding but may nonetheless exercise significant influence on behavior.
Other social scientists slightly vary these definitions of international hard and soft law,
viewing international legal instruments as lying along a hard-soft law continuum in terms
of different features, such as the law’s precision, obligation and delegation to a third party
for dispute resolution, each of which can be of a harder and softer nature.2 Much of this
literature assesses the relative functional attributes and deficiencies of hard and soft law
instruments as alternatives for international governance, as well as how these instruments
can be combined sequentially as mutually reinforcing complements to lead to greater
international cooperation over time. The literature on hard and soft law, in turn, has
influenced our understanding of transatlantic economic cooperation, in which the United
States (US) and the European Union (EU) have undertaken a wide range of agreements,
both bilateral and multilateral, and largely of a soft-law variety.
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The existing scholarly literature on hard and soft law can be divided into three
camps: legal positivists, rationalists and constructivists.3 All three of these camps
predominantly view hard and soft law as interacting in complementary ways, but they
have different starting points. Many legal positivists question if soft law can be
considered to be law at all because it is not legally binding, but, in any case, they view it
at best as an inferior instrument whose only rationale is to serve as a stepping stone to
hard (real) law. Rationalists, in contrast, contend that states choose between hard and
soft law instruments depending on the level of commitment that they wish to make.
Since rationalists find that both hard and soft law can be advantageous to states in
different circumstances, neither should be judged to be superior.

For example,

rationalists contend that because soft law is less costly for states to negotiate and less
costly to their sovereignty, states will prefer it in situations of uncertainty where they
need to learn more about the intentions of the other parties or about the underlying
technical issues. Constructivists, in contrast to rationalists, maintain that state interests
are formed through socialization processes of interstate interaction which soft law can
facilitate. They thus favor soft law instruments for their capacity to generate shared
norms and a sense of common purpose and identity. Many constructivists also focus on
the role of non-state actors who only have soft law instruments available and who use
these instruments to catalyze change in international law and national regulatory practice.
As with legal positivists, both rationalists and constructivist scholars contend that soft
law can lead to hard law and, once formed, can help to further elaborate hard law,
resulting in progressive cycles of law-making leading to greater regulatory cooperation.
For purposes of this chapter, we will remain agnostic as to which of these three
camps most accurately captures the nature of hard and soft law and their relative
advantages, although we have our own views in this respect.4 We will remain agnostic
because our primary purpose in this chapter is to reveal what is missing in the analysis of
all three camps because of their focus on hard-soft law interaction only in complementary
terms. We make two central claims. Our first and primary claim is that international
3

A full explication of these three modes of scholarship and their approaches to hard and soft law
interaction is set forth in Part I.C.
4
Neither of us are legal formalists, and both of us can be viewed primarily as rationalists because of our
focus on actors and their interests, although our approach is of a soft rationalist variant which takes
seriously constructivist insights.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156867

3
hard and soft law instruments (or, for that matter, any legal instruments that vary in their
soft and hard law characteristics) can serve not only as alternatives or as complements but
indeed as antagonists, working at cross-purposes with each other. Hard and soft law may
interact as complements, we argue, but only under certain conditions, including most
notably the absence of significant distributive conflict among parties to such agreements.
Under other conditions, however, which we identify as the existence of distributive
conflicts and of pluralistic regime complexes, hard and soft law may interact in an
antagonistic fashion. In this sense, the existing literature may be accused of selection
bias, focusing on those issue-areas in which distributive conflict is low and where the
interaction of hard and soft law is correspondingly largely complementary.
Our second claim is that this antagonistic interaction between hard and soft law
has particular implications in a fragmented international system, affecting the very nature
of international hard and soft law regimes and their purported advantages. We will show
how the interaction of hard and soft law regimes can lead to the “hardening” of soft law
regimes, resulting in more strategic bargaining and reducing their purported advantages
of consensus-building through information-sharing and persuasion, and the “softening” of
hard law regimes, resulting in reduced legal certainty and predictability.
The chapter is in five parts. Part I provides an overview of the existing literature
regarding the definitions of hard and soft law (section A), the relative attributes and
deficiencies of hard and soft law as alternatives (section B), and how hard and soft law
can act as complements, leading to greater cooperation (section C). Part II provides the
background theoretical context for assessing the roles and interaction of hard and soft law
in international regulatory governance as alternatives, complements and antagonists,
namely the role of US and EU economic and institutional power (section A), the role of
distributive conflict between the US, EU and third countries (section B), and the
challenges posed by international regime fragmentation (section C). Part III assess how,
in the presence of distributive conflicts and fragmented regime complexes, hard and soft
law can just as likely act as opposing tools aimed to counter each other’s influence,
focusing on the US/EU dispute over genetically modified foods as an illustrative case
study.
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Part IV then sets forth three hypotheses regarding how hard and soft law
instruments interact in international governance, and, in particular, the conditions under
which they work in a complementary or opposing manner. Our first two hypotheses
concern the impact of US and EU cooperation and rivalry on how international hard and
soft law regimes interact. We contend that where the US and EU agree on a regulatory
approach, in particular because distributive conflict between them is weak or absent, we
are more likely to see hard and soft law work as complements in an evolutionary manner,
consistent with the existing literature (section A). In contrast, where the US and EU
disagree on a regulatory approach, we are more likely to see hard and soft law work in
opposition to each other, especially where there are distributional consequences which
spur the US and EU to attempt to advance their perspectives in different international
regimes (section B). Given the fragmented nature of the international system, the US and
EU will attempt to advance their interests in those regimes that they find to be most
favorable to their positions.

In such settings, we argue, soft law regimes may be

“hardened” through their links to other regimes, losing the purported soft law advantages
of flexibility and informality, while hard law regimes such as the World Trade
Organization’s dispute settlement process may be “softened.” The United States and the
European Union are not the only actors, however, capable of strategically manipulating
hard and soft law regimes. Hence, even where the US and EU agree on a regulatory
approach, smaller states can also use hard and soft law strategies to attempt to thwart US
and EU aims, again choosing regimes more favorable to their positions in a fragmented
international system (section C). However, the US and EU have significant advantages
because of their market power and resources, and they can attempt to play smaller
countries off of each other, including through bilateral negotiations.
We conclude that scholars and policymakers need to recognize more explicitly
that there are often real distributive conflicts in international regulatory relations,
resulting in conflicts between hard and soft law instruments and regimes. We find that
this development is not necessarily to be lamented, but rather reflects a maturation of
international law, which is responding to global developments in a world of diverse
regulatory competences in which regulation in countries and in diverse international
regimes mutually affect each other. This chapter’s findings call for future research
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regarding how international hard and soft law instruments and regimes interact in
different contexts.

I. The Canonical Literature on International Hard and Soft Law: Their Attributes
as Alternatives and their Interaction as Complements

We begin with an overview of scholarship concerning the definitions of hard and
soft law, and this scholarship’s assessment of the various attributes and deficiencies of
hard and soft law as alternatives. We create a typology of this literature into three camps,
each of which predominantly views hard and soft law to act as complements, leading to
greater international cooperation. We here provide the background for our argument that
the existing literature exhibits a selection bias as regards how hard and soft law interact.
In Parts II and III, we will show how, in a world of distributional conflict within a
decentralized governance system, hard and soft law instruments (or, for that matter, any
international legal instruments) can frequently work in opposition to each other as
antagonists, affecting the operation of international regimes in the process.

A. Definitions of Hard and Soft Law
To assess how hard and soft law interact in international governance, we must
first define these terms. Here there is much disagreement in the existing literature. Many
legal scholars use a simple binary binding/non-binding divide to distinguish hard from
soft law.5 Positivist legal scholars tend to deny the very concept of “soft law,” since law
by definition is “binding.”6 Rational institutionalist scholars respond that “the term
‘binding agreement’ is a misleading hyperbole” when it comes to international affairs,
but they still find that the language of “binding commitments” matters in terms of
5

See the leading study by Shelton et al (2000) which settles for this distinction, at 4. See also Reininke and
Witte 2000: 76 (“soft law as used herein means normative agreements that are not legally binding”);
Snyder 1993: 198 (“soft law consists of “rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force
but which nevertheless may have practical effects”); and Klabbers 1996: 168 (advocating retention of the
“traditional binary conception of law”).
6
Klabbers takes a positivist approach, arguing that “law can’t be more or less binding” so that the soft law
concept is logically flawed. Klabbers 1996: 181. Prosper Weil takes a normative approach, arguing that
the increasing use of soft law represents a shift pursuant to which international law norms vary in their
relative normativity, and he finds that this trend “might destabilize the whole international normative
system and turn it into an instrument that can no longer serve its purpose.” Weil 1983: 423.
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signaling by states of the seriousness of their commitments, such that non-compliance
will entail greater reputational costs.7 Constructivist scholars, in contrast, focus less on
the binding nature of law at the enactment stage, and more on the effectiveness of law at
the implementation stage, addressing the gap between the law-in-the-books and the lawin-action. They note how even domestic law varies in terms of its impact on behavior, so
that binary distinctions between binding “hard law” and non-binding “soft law” are
illusory.8 They find that the very concept of “binding” international law is highly suspect
as an operational concept. At the international level where centralized institutions are
typically missing, most observers realize that “most international law is ‘soft’ in
distinctive ways.”9
Working within this rationalist perspective, Kenneth Abbott and his coauthors
have defined legalization in international relations as consisting of a spectrum of three
factors (i) precision of rules; (ii) obligation; and (iii) delegation to a third-party decisionmaker.10

International regimes vary in the extent of their legalization along these

dimensions, which can give them a “harder” or “softer” legal character. In this respect,
hard law “refers to legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be made precise
through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority
for interpreting and implementing the law.”11 International trade law, at least formally,
comes closest to this ideal type, although as we will see, it too is soft (or can become soft)
in certain areas.12
By contrast with this ideal-type of hard law, soft law can be defined as a residual
category: “The realm of ‘soft law’ begins once legal arrangements are weakened along

7

Lipson 1991: 508. See also Raustiala 2005; and Guzman 2008 and Guzman 2005. Guzman states that “an
agreement is soft if it is not a formal treaty.” Guzman 2005: 591. He finds that states rationally choose soft
law because they wish to reduce the cost to their reputation of potentially violating it in light of uncertainty.
8
Some scholars accuse legal formalists of “elite ignorance” and “non-knowledge of the social.” See, for
example, Goodrich 2000: 150.
9
Abbott and Snidal 2000: 421.
10
Abbott at al. 2000. Abbott and Snidal work within a “rational design” approach to international
institutions, in Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001. See also Guzman 2008.
11
Abbott and Snidal 2000: 37.
12
See our discussion in Part III below. In addition, from a formal perspective, international trade law does
not have independent enforcement power. Rather WTO panels authorize a winning party to withdraw
equivalent concessions, in an amount determined by the panel, in the event of non-compliance by the losing
party.
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one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation.”13 Thus, if an
agreement is not formally binding, it is soft along one dimension. Similarly, if an
agreement is formally binding but its content is vague so that the agreement leaves almost
complete discretion to the parties as to its implementation, then the agreement is soft
along this second dimension. Finally, if an agreement does not delegate any authority to
a third party to monitor its implementation or to interpret and enforce it, then the
agreement again can be soft because the parties can discursively justify their acts in
legalistic terms with less consequence, whether in terms of reputational costs or other
sanctions.
Some scholars with sociological, constructivist leanings have questioned the
characterization of law in terms of these three attributes (precision, obligation and
delegation) because it distracts from how law operates normatively.14 They likely do so
because of their opposition to a presumption among legal positivists and rational
institutionalists that “hardness” means binding rules interpreted and enforced by courts.
In other words, their counterparts in interdisciplinary debates in international relations —
realist and rationalist institutionalist scholars — tend to discount the efficacy of soft law
because it creates no binding obligation on states who can thus ignore it at their whim in
light of their interests.

For example, Richard Steinberg contends, from a realist

perspective, that “most public international lawyers, realists and positivists, consider soft
law to be inconsequential.”15 Similarly, Andrew Guzman maintains, from a rational
institutionalist perspective, that “soft law represents a choice by the parties to enter into a
weaker form of commitment.”16 Guzman and Steinberg focus on states’ pursuit of predetermined interests. They do not address how states may change those interests through
13

Abbott and Snidal 2000: 38.
See e.g., Finnemore and Toope 2001 (taking a more sociological perspective, and critiquing Abbott et
al’s formal definition of legalization because it obscures how law and legal norms actually operate in
practice). We also recognize that these formal definitions can obscure the relative roles of “hard” and “soft”
law in sociological terms—that is, from the way law and norms operate in the world, which indeed is what
interests us. Binding dispute settlement can be ignored or simply reflect existing power asymmetries, so
that “hard” law may in fact not be so “hard” in practice. Similarly, softer forms of law can be much more
transformative of state and constituent conduct, which should be the real measure of law’s impact in the
world. Despite these caveats, we believe that that hard/soft distinction does capture something important
about the making and implementation of international law, and we find the distinction to be particularly
useful for our analyses of how hard and soft law regimes and instruments interact.
15
Steinberg 2002: 340
16
Guzman, 2005: 611
14
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transnational processes of interaction, deliberation and persuasion coordinated through
international institutions.
Constructivists, in contrast, explicitly address how international regimes can lead
states to change their perceptions of state interests.17

International law scholars

frequently take such an approach. For example, Abraham and Antonia Chayes contend,
“what is left out of the institutionalist account is the active role of the regime in
modifying preferences, generating new options, persuading the parties to move toward
increasing compliance with regime norms, and guiding the evolution of the normative
structure in the direction of the overall objectives of the regime.”18 Similarly Harold Koh
stresses the “internalization” processes to which international law gives rise through
iterative processes involving interpretation over time,19 and Thomas Franck stresses the
compliance pull of international law that is deemed legitimate in its procedures.20 From
the constructivist perspective, soft law mechanisms can be as or more effective than hard
law by creating settings in which states engage in open-ended discussions to reach better
and more effective policy because they are less wary of rigid hard law consequences.
In sum, the typology used by Abbott and Snidal does not prejudge these
instruments’ relative value.

Rather, the typology simply characterizes different

instruments which actors may choose in terms of their precision, binding legal obligation
and delegation along a continuum.

We find this typology and continuum to be

particularly useful for our analyses of how hard and soft law instruments and regimes
interact, and thus we adopt the definition of Abbott and Snidal for our purposes.

B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Hard and Soft Law as Alternatives
States and private actors have increasingly used a wide range of instruments
having a relatively harder or softer legal nature in terms of precision, obligation and
delegation to advance their aims. These instruments offer different advantages and

17

Ruggie 1998.
Chayes and Chayes 1993: 229; see also Franck 1990 (on the “compliance pull” of law); and Koh 1998
(on “internalization” processes).
19
The transnational legal process theory of Harold Koh addresses how states internalize legal norms
through repeated “interaction,” including through the work of non-state actors, resulting in new
“interpretation,” which is “internalized” within states at the domestic level. Koh 1998.
20
FRANCK 1990.
18
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disadvantages in different contexts, involving factors at the domestic and international
levels. They are sometimes used alone and sometimes combined dynamically over time,
resulting in a complex hybrid of hard and soft law instruments. In this section, we
address the use of hard and soft law instruments as alternatives in light of their respective
attributes and deficiencies before turning to an assessment of how they interact.
The quantitative growth in the use of international hard and soft law instruments
reflects the breadth and intensification of economic globalization, by which we mean “a
process of widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide connectedness, in
particular in the economic sphere.”21 The very emergence of the soft law concept reflects
the multiplication of producers of international law in this context, including not only
foreign ministries, but also sector-specific transgovernmental networks, supranational
bureaucracies, multinational corporations and business associations, and international
non-governmental organizations.22 These groups generally do not have the authority to
create binding international law in a traditional sense, which is reserved to states, yet they
use non-binding instruments to advance their policy goals, instruments which may be
subsequently transformed into binding hard law, at either the national or international
levels.23
Private actors can also work with and through states to create binding hard law. As
John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos find in their masterful study of thirteen areas of global
business regulation, business actors play frequently leading roles. First, Braithwaite and
Drahos find that “state regulation follows industry self-regulatory practice more than the
reverse.”24 Janet Levit’s recent work on the law of documentary letters of credit provides
an excellent example.25 Second, corporate actors enroll states to advance their aims. In
this respect, Braithwaite and Drahos find that “US corporations exert more power in the
world system than corporations of other states because they can enroll the support of the
most powerful state in the world.”26

21

We adapt this definition from Held et al, 1999: 2.
Robilant 2005: 500.
23
Functional state agencies, however, will play the leading roles in areas within their competence, which
can result in hard law. Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 479-485.
24
Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 481.
25
Levit 2008.
26
Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 482.
22
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As an institutional form, hard law features many advantages. In particular,
rationalist scholars find that:
•

Hard law instruments allow states to commit themselves more credibly
to international agreements.

Hard law instruments make state

commitments more credible because they increase the cost of reneging,
whether on account of legal sanctions or on account of the costs to a
state’s reputation where it is found to have acted in violation of its legal
commitments.27
•

Hard law treaties are more credible because they can have direct legal
effects in national jurisdictions (being “self-executing”), or they can
require domestic legal enactment.

Where treaty obligations are

implemented through domestic legislation, they create new tools that
mobilize domestic actors, increasing the audience costs of a violation
and thus making their commitments more credible.28
•

Hard law instruments solve problems of incomplete contracting by
creating mechanisms for the interpretation and elaboration of legal
commitments over time.29

•

Hard law instruments better permit states to monitor and enforce their
commitments, including through the use of dispute settlement bodies
such as courts.30

States, as well as private actors working with and through state representatives, thus tend
to use hard law where the benefits of cooperation are great and the potential for
opportunism and its costs are high.31 To control for the risks of opportunism, they can
create third party monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, as under the WTO
27

States are arguably particularly concerned with their reputation for compliance. Andrew Guzman
contends that states’ calculus over the reputational costs of non-compliance is the primary factor for
explaining state compliance with international law. Guzman 2005. See also Abbott and Snidal 2000; and
Lipson 1991: 508.
28
Abbott and Snidal 2000.
29
Abbott and Snidal 2000.
30
Abbott and Snidal 2000: 38.
31
Abbott and Snidal: 2000: 429.

11
committee, trade policy review and dispute settlement systems. These monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms reduce the transaction costs of subsequent interstate interaction
through providing an ongoing forum for interpreting, applying, enforcing and elaborating
agreed rules.32
Yet hard law also entails significant costs. It can create formal commitments that
restrict the behavior of states, thus infringing on national sovereignty in potentially
sensitive areas. As a result, it can encourage states to bargain fiercely and at length
regarding the legally binding commitments into which they are entering which will
continue to apply over time. Because states are more likely to drag out negotiations over
legally binding commitments, the use of hard law can increase contracting costs. In
addition, hard law agreements can be more difficult to amend to adapt to changing
circumstances. Therefore writing detailed binding agreements may be wasteful because
it can force states to plan for contingent events that may not occur, and can lead to
undesired rigidity or prevent agreement altogether.33 Soft law, in contrast, can be adapted,
amended and replaced more easily because its provisions are non-binding and thus no
single state or group of states can block its amendment.
Defenders of soft law argue that soft law instruments offer significant offsetting
advantages over hard law. They find, in particular, that:
•

Soft law instruments are easier and less costly to negotiate.

•

Soft law instruments impose lower “sovereignty costs” on states in sensitive
areas.

•

Soft law instruments provide greater flexibility for states to cope with
uncertainty and learn over time.

•

Soft law instruments allow states to be more ambitious and engage in
“deeper” cooperation than they would if they had to worry about enforcement.

•

32

Soft law instruments cope better with diversity.

Abbott and Snidal 2000: 430.
Abbott and Snidal 2000: 433. Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2006. These arguments also support the use of
soft law in purely domestic settings as advocated by the “new governance literature.” See Scott and de
Burca 2006.

33
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•

Soft law instruments are available to non-state actors, including international
secretariats, sub-state public actors such as administrative agencies and
business associations and non-governmental organizations.34

Abbott and Snidal, for example, contend that states use soft law where contracting costs
increase, whether because of the number of parties involved, factual uncertainty,
domestic ratification challenges, politically charged issue areas or distributional
asymmetries. They note how, in these contexts, “states can limit their legal obligation
through hortatory language, exceptions, reservations and the like,” such as safeguard and
rebalancing clauses under the WTO.35
Both rationalist and constructivist scholars recognize the potential advantages of
soft law instruments, but they do so in different ways. While rationalist-oriented scholars
focus on the reduction of contracting and sovereignty costs under soft law, constructivist
scholars stress how soft law can “facilitate constitutive processes such as persuasion,
learning, argumentation, and socialization.”36

While rationalist scholars note the

importance of soft law instruments for generating information leading to common
understandings in situations of uncertainty, constructivist scholars contend that soft law
instruments can help states to develop common norms and a sense of a collective
enterprise. For both rationalists and constructivists, then, soft law can create mechanisms
for parties to learn about consequences before obligations are made binding.

This

process occurred under the Montreal Protocol for Protection of the Ozone, an agreement
to protect a global commons, the earth’s atmosphere. Soft law instruments can bring a
broad array of participants together, as under a framework convention, in a process that
over time permits them to gain trust, leading to harder obligations in the future.37
Soft law instruments, nonetheless, have obvious disadvantages. First, from a
normative perspective, if soft law instruments are effective, they can be criticized for
their relative obscurity, since they can remove law-making from democratic oversight,
34

For good discussions on the purported strengths of soft law, see e.g. Lipson 1991: 500-501, 514-527
(discussing the strengths of “informal agreements”); Raustiala and Victor 1998: 684-686; Hillgenburg
1999: 501, 504; Abbott and Snidal 2000: 38-39; Trubek, Cotrell and Nance 2006; Trebilcock and Kirtin
2004; and Sindico 2006: 832.
35
Abbott and Snidal 2004: 54.
36
Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2006: 75.
37
Brunnee and Toope 1997.

13
such that provisions with distributive implications are not fully discussed within
legislative or other government bodies.38 Second, from the perspective of effectiveness,
soft law instruments create little or no legal obligation and provide no binding third-party
dispute settlement to resolve disputes among the parties and fill in the details of
incomplete contracts. Soft law instruments, depending on their level of precision, may
also make it difficult to determine whether a state is acting in accordance with its
commitments and thus create greater opportunities to evade responsibility.39

For

example, the OECD created a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of financial experts
which issued guidelines which limit sovereignty costs because of their soft law nature.
Some commentators, however, have found that the task force guidelines have been
largely ineffective in leading to policy change.40 Similarly, at the 1992 Rio Summit, the
parties only agreed to a non-binding set of principles and an Agenda 21 to create a
“comprehensive plan of action,” contrary to the demands of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for a hard law treaty.

Skeptics question the

effectiveness of these soft law instruments. They contend that much of international law,
when it lacks teeth, can be simply symbolic, constituting a form of junk law.41
It would nonetheless be a mistake, in our view, to view hard law instruments as
always preferable to soft law instruments from the standpoint of effectiveness, even
though states may sometimes use soft law instruments only to paper over differences. As
Kal Raustiala points out, we must distinguish between the concepts of compliance (as
with hard law obligations) and effectiveness.42 He writes, “compliance as a concept
draws no causal linkage between a rule and behavior, but simply identifies a conformity
between the rule and behavior. To speak of effectiveness is to speak directly of causality:
to claim that a rule is ‘effective’ is to claim that it led to certain behavior or outcomes,
which may or may not meet the legal standard of compliance.”43 In terms of the law-inaction, we are less concerned with formal compliance, which may mean little if the
38

See Klabbers 1998, Levit 2008.
Abbott and Snidal 2000: 446.
40
Simmons 2000: 244-263. Cf. Machado 2008.
41
Cf Edelman 1964 Goldsmith and Posner 2005; Raustiala 2005; Susskind and Ozawa 1992.
42
Raustiala 2000: 398; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002. On the “depth” of cooperation, i.e. cooperative
agreements that require a greater change in state behavior relative to the status quo, see Downs, Rocke and
Barsoom 1996.
43
Raustiala 2000: 398.
39
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obligations reflect no policy change, than with effectiveness, in terms of attaining policy
goals. Advocates of soft law as an alternative contend that soft law can be more effective
in practice than many formally binding treaties.
In sum, hard and soft law instruments offer different advantages for different
contexts involving a range of factors that actors consider. For these reasons, a growing
number of scholars in law and political science have advocated a pragmatic approach,
selecting alternative hard and soft law approaches depending on the characteristics of the
issue and the negotiating and institutional context in question. Scholars have noted, in
particular, how hard and soft law instruments may be effectively combined to lead to
greater cooperation. Yet as Abbott and Snidal write, while “soft law sometimes [is]
designed as a way station to harder legalization, … often it is preferable on its own
terms” as an alternative.44

C. Hard and Soft Law Interaction as Complements
Although the respective costs and benefits of hard and soft law remain a subject
of contention, legal and political science scholars have moved increasingly towards a
view that hard and soft international law can build upon each other as complementary
tools for international problem-solving. These scholars contend that hard and soft law
mechanisms can build upon each other in two predominant ways: (1) non-binding soft
law can lead the way to binding hard law, and (2) binding hard law can subsequently be
elaborated through soft law instruments. For example, a leading US international law
casebook introduces the concept of soft law in terms of how “soft law instruments are
consciously used to generate support for the promulgation of treaties or to help generate
customary international law norms [i.e. binding hard law],” and how “treaties and state
practice give rise to soft law that supplements and advances treaty and customary
norms.”45 Scholars thus take a pragmatic policy-oriented approach to show how hard and
soft law instruments provide not only alternative tools for cooperation, but also serve as

44
45

Abbott and Snidal 2000: 423.
Dunoff et al. 2006: 95.

15
complements of each other in dynamic processes of legalization, leading to greater
international [regulatory] cooperation and coordination over time.46
These scholars’ views regarding hard and soft law complements can be divided
into three camps: (1) positivist legal scholars who find that soft law is inferior to hard law
but should not be discarded because it can potentially lead to hard law; (2) rationalist
scholars with a political economy orientation who view soft law as a complement to hard
law which serves state interests in many contexts, including because the hard law option
is not available; and (3) constructivist scholars who view soft law as a complement to
hard law which may be desirable in itself by facilitating dialogic and experimentalist
transnational and domestic processes which transform norms, understandings and
perceptions of state interests.
Positivist legal scholars find that soft law is inferior to hard law because it does
not correspond to the ideal type of law.47 That is, soft law lacks formally binding
obligations which are interpreted and enforced by courts, and it thus fails to generate
jurisprudence over time. For this reason, these scholars view soft law as a second-best
alternative to hard law, either as a way-station on the way to hard law, or as a fall-back
when hard law approaches fail.48 Kirton and Trebilcock, for example, in a study of the
use of soft and hard law in global trade, environment and social governance, find “strong
support for the familiar feeling that soft law is a second-best substitute for a first-best
hard law, being created when and because the relevant hard law does not exist and the
intergovernmental negotiations to produce it have failed.”49 Sindico likewise writes,
“[s]oft law, and voluntary standards in particular, are a stage in the creation of
international legal norms. It is as a pioneer of hard law that soft law finds its raison
d’être in the normative challenge for sustainable global governance.”50 The implication
is that soft law otherwise has no raison d’être. Sindico, for example, views the corporate
social responsibility (CSR) movement in terms of “the beginning of a step towards
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comprehensive hard law in this field,”51 as opposed to a flexible, adaptive process which
is valuable in itself.
These scholars often view soft law solely in terms of its relationship to a hard law
ideal. In her valuable introduction to a special volume on soft law organized by the
American Society of International Law (ASIL), for example, Dinah Shelton categorizes
soft law in the following five ways, each of which is linked to positivist conceptions of
hard law:

“(i) Elaborative soft law, that is principles that provide guidance to the
interpretation, elaboration, or application of hard law [i.e. soft law which builds
from hard law]…
(ii) Emergent hard law, that is principles that are first formulated in non-binding
form with the possibility, or even aspiration, of negotiating a subsequent treaty, or
harden into binding custom through the development of state practice and opinio
juris [i.e. soft law which builds to hard law]…
(iii) Soft law as evidence of the existence of hard obligations [i.e. soft law which
builds to hard customary international law].
(iv) Parallel soft and hard law, that is similar provisions articulated in both hard
and soft forms allowing the soft version to act as a fall-back provision.
(v) Soft law as a source of legal obligation, through acquiescence and estoppel,
perhaps against the original intentions of the parties.”52

Reinicke and Witte likewise stress, in their cross-cutting overview in the same volume,
how soft law agreements “can and often do represent the first important element in an
evolutionary process that shapes legal relationships among and between multiple actors,
51
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facilitating and ultimately enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of transnational
policy-making.”53 Similarly, John Kirton and Michael Trebilcock conclude that “at best,
it [soft law], is a complement.”54
Abbott and Snidal, in contrast, taking a rational institutionalist political economy
approach, are agnostic as to whether hard or soft law is preferable because they focus on
varying state interests in different contexts.

Sometimes states prefer hard law and

sometimes soft law to advance their joint policy aims. In their work on the “pathways to
cooperation,” Abbott and Snidal nonetheless define three pathways of which two
explicitly involve the progressive hardening of law. The three pathways are: the use of a
framework convention which subsequently deepens in the precision of its coverage; the
use of a plurilateral agreement which subsequently broadens in its membership; and the
use of a soft law instrument which subsequently leads to binding legal commitments.
They note how these three pathways can be “blended” and “sequenced,” once more
resulting in a mutually reinforcing, evolutionary interaction between hard and soft law
mechanisms.55
Finally, constructivist-oriented scholars likewise focus on how hard and soft law
are used as complements.

For example, Braithwaite and Drahos point both to the

importance of using framework conventions and soft law as a first step which “can, over
time be more detailed through rule-making.”56 They contend that neither hard nor soft
law provisions should necessarily be privileged because states and non-state actors need
flexibility to address situations that involve uncertainty and require experimentation.
Trubek and his co-authors, for example, contend that soft law instruments can help to
generate knowledge (as through the use of benchmarking, peer review, and exchange of
good practices), develop shared ideas, build trust, and, if desirable, establish “nonbinding standards that can eventually harden into binding rules once uncertainties are
reduced and a higher degree of consensus ensues.”57 Janet Levit, working in a legal
pluralist framework, finds that international soft law instruments generate normativity
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that affects both subsequent hard law enactments and judicial decisions.58 Some scholars
working in an experimentalist “new governance” tradition go further, arguing that soft
law approaches should generally be privileged to promote responsive governance.59

II. Theorizing International Hard and Soft Law Interaction:
Power, Distributive Conflict and Regime Complexes

The existing literature on hard and soft law typically takes as its starting
assumption the possibility of joint gains from cooperation among states, and proceeds to
explore the advantages and disadvantages, the choice, and the effectiveness of hard and
soft law approaches to international cooperation. We agree that the prospect of joint
gains is an important prerequisite for international cooperation, and we have seen in Part
I that such prospects continue to exist for international policy cooperation.
Nevertheless, we cannot fully understand our central question – the interaction of
hard and soft law – without considering the ways in which power, distributional conflict,
and regime complexes affect how hard and soft law regimes interact, and whether they
will do so productively. Indeed, we argue below that the harmonious, complementary,
mutually reinforcing interaction of hard and soft law relies on a hitherto unspecified set
of scope conditions, including most importantly in particular a low level of distributional
conflict among the players. These conditions may hold in certain areas, we maintain, but
there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that variation in distributive
conflict will spur hard and soft law regimes to interact in different ways, sometimes as
alternatives, sometimes as complements and sometimes as antagonists.
In this section, therefore, we lay out our theoretical argument about the reasons
why, and the conditions under which, we expect hard and soft law to interact as
antagonists. The analysis is in three parts. First, reflecting the transatlantic theme of this
volume, we examine the sources of United States and European Union power in
international regulatory affairs, arguing that both market size and institutional
58
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characteristics have made the US and the EU the leading, and roughly equal, powers in
global as well as bilateral regulatory cooperation (section A). Next, we argue that
international regulatory cooperation, and indeed international cooperation more broadly,
is frequently characterized by intense distributional conflict, in which actors like the US
and the EU may have sharply differing preferences over regulatory outcomes, with each
side attempting to export its own regulatory model and force the costs of adjustment onto
others (section B). Finally, we examine the problems of “regime complexes” and legal
fragmentation in international regulation, arguing that states with divergent preferences
will have strong incentives to engage in forum shopping and “strategic inconsistency,”
using competing legal fora to press their substantive preferences (section C). Parts III
and IV will then build on this analysis, making the argument that under conditions of
distributive conflict and regime complexes, hard and soft law can interact not as
alternatives or complements, but as mutually undermining antagonists.

A. The EU, the US, and Power in International Regulatory Governance
The United States and European Union collectively represent over 50 percent of
global production, and over 40 percent in terms of purchasing power parity.60 In 2006,
EU gross domestic product was slightly larger than the United States’, but not by a
significant extent. Because of the size of their markets, where the US and EU agree on a
common regulatory policy, they are well-positioned to promote it globally. For example,
as Germain contends in the area of financial regulation, the size of the international
markets handled in New York, London and a few other major cities “empower their
respective state authorities” to be leaders in global regulation.61 Where they disagree,
there is often deadlock, reflecting the equal size of their economies and markets. With
the rise of the economies of China, India, Brazil and other developing countries, the US
and EU have a long-term interest in exercising global regulatory leadership now in order
to lock their preferences into international law and institutions, but conflicts between
60
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them may inhibit their ability to do so.
The US and EU have launched a series of initiatives to promote transatlantic
collaboration in global governance which we have assessed in our earlier work. The
creation of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the Transatlantic Economic
Partnership (TEP) during the 1990s were premised on the idea of joint gains from
transatlantic economic integration and in particular from joint regulatory cooperation
across a wide range of issue-areas.62

Alongside the traditional processes of trade

negotiation and trade dispute resolution, the transatlantic partners forged new
mechanisms for cooperation among economic regulators in areas ranging from
competition policy to data privacy, the environment, and food safety.63 Among the goals
of the NTA was to promote US and EU joint leadership in global economic governance.
These goals have been reasserted during the second term of the George W. Bush
administration, in particular with the creation, in 2007, of a Transatlantic Economic
Council designed to lend high-level impetus to new and continuing efforts at transatlantic
economic cooperation in various issue-areas.64
Although market size generally explains the growing role of the EU as a global
actor in economic and regulatory fields, US and EU bargaining power can also be
affected by each side’s institutional characteristics. Where policy-making is reserved to a
sub-federal level in the United States or a sub-EU level in the European Union, then the
US or EU respectively will be in a weaker bargaining situation at the international level.
The United States over time has more frequently been a global leader in regulatory
domains because it has had greater institutional power at the federal level, combined with
its great market power. However, in many regulatory areas, the US has fragmented
authority over regulatory standard-setting, leaving it to US states within the federal
62
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context or to private associations.

As Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe write, “When

standardization becomes an increasingly international process, the organizational
characteristics of the European standardization system make for a more felicitous match
between the national and international institutions than the characteristics of the largely
anarchic American system.”65 They conclude, “[t]he process of aggregating technical
preferences and projecting consensus standards to a higher level is considerably more
difficult in the decentralized and uncoordinated standards system of the U.S., where the
nominal national representative for international standardization is a weak and contested
institution.” 66
As greater policy-making powers have been delegated within Europe to EU
institutions over time, the EU has increased its negotiating clout internationally. Because
of the size of the EU’s internal market, once the EU member states harmonize regulatory
policies at the EU level and develop corresponding EU-level regulatory institutions, the
EU is well-positioned to exercise economic clout as a global actor. To give an example,
Elliot Posner addresses how the establishment of the EU’s regulatory competence and its
extraterritorial reach are key explanations for the EU’s increased authority over financial
services regulation.67 Institutional developments in the EU have affected powerful US
firms who, in turn, motivated the US Securities and Exchange Commission to work with
EU authorities to accommodate and recognize EU standards in a number of areas. This
development occurred following an extended period of benign (or malign) US neglect of
European approaches to financial services regulation.

As the EU assumes greater

institutional power in Europe, it should also be able to exercise greater authority in
international governance. In other words, the EU enhances its international authority
both by widening (enhancing its market power through increasing EU membership) and
by deepening (enhancing its institutional power through expanding the scope of EU
authority to more policy areas).
Finally, the US and EU exercise considerable authority globally because of the
regulatory expertise they have developed domestically. In their study of thirteen areas of
65
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global business regulation, John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos conclude that “the fact that
US and EU law are modeled more than others is not only because of their economic
hegemony and the fact that weaker economies want to meet their terms for admission to
the clubs they dominate. In the case of the US in particular, modeling is underwritten by
the sheer depth of regulatory expertise Washington agencies can offer.”68 They find that
the US played a leading role in twelve of the thirteen areas they studied (all but for
international labour regulation) and the EU played a leading role in nine of these areas.69
Overall, they find that “the US is the biggest demander of new regulatory agreements as
well as the strongest resister of regimes other states want.”70

However, “the EC

[European Community] is more important because of the way it dominates the US in
agenda-setting in a few arenas — prescription drugs, food, automobile safety — and is
nearly an equal partner to the US in agenda-setting for other regimes.”71 As a result, they
find that while “most global regulatory agendas are set by the US; if the EC vetoes those
agendas, they go nowhere.”72
In sum, effective cooperation between the world’s two economic powers offers
the promise of joint gains for both sides and more effective global leadership on
regulatory matters. Yet a careful cross-sectoral analysis of transatlantic economic
relations demonstrates that their cooperation varies significantly by issue area, limiting
the two sides’ ability to exercise joint leadership in global governance.73 This variation
reflects the distributive implications of the governance alternatives respectively favoured
by the US and EU. It is to these distributive issues that we now turn.

B. The Challenge of Distributive Conflict
Despite the general promise of regimes in fostering international cooperation to
achieve joint gains, international relations scholars have identified a number of potential
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obstacles to successful regime-based cooperation.74 We focus in this chapter on two such
impediments: the problems of distributive conflict (discussed in this section) and of
fragmented regime complexes (discussed in section C below). Distributive conflicts, we
note immediately, need not arise from narrow economic or protectionist motives on the
part of states, but can and do reflect different configurations of interests, institutional
procedures and ideological and cultural perspectives at the national level — in other
words, different interests, institutions and ideas – which in turn shape the regulatory
preferences of states at the international level.75
International law theorists, taking from regime theory in international relations,
often point to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game in assessing the role of international
law.

To give one leading example, Andrew Guzman in his impressive book How

International Law Works, writes, “It is in the context of [the prisoner’s dilemma] game
that the theory is applied throughout most of this book.”76 The distributive challenge to
regime theory calls into question the appropriateness of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game as
the proper model for most instances of international cooperation because it fails to
capture the potential for distributive conflicts among the participants. In the classic PD
model, states are assumed to have a common interest in reaching a cooperative outcome,
and the primary impediment to successful cooperation is the fear that other states will
cheat on their agreements. In PD models of international relations, these problems are
typically addressed by creating mechanisms for the monitoring of state behavior and the
sanctioning of states that violate the terms of the agreement — i.e. international law. If
PD is an accurate description of the situation facing states, then international regimes and
international hard and soft law should indeed facilitate cooperation by monitoring
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compliance and (in the case of hard law dispute-settlement bodies) by providing for
enforcement.
However, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game deemphasizes another important obstacle
to successful cooperation, namely conflicts among states with different interests over the
distribution of the costs and benefits of cooperation.77 That is to say, when states
cooperate in international politics, they do not simply choose between “cooperation” and
“defection,” the binary choices available in PD games, but rather they choose specific
terms of cooperation, such as the specific level of various tariffs in a trade regime, or the
precise levels of greenhouse gas emissions in an environmental regime, and so on. As
James Morrow notes, “There is only one way to cooperate in prisoners’ dilemma; there
are many ways to cooperate in the real world.”78 In game-theoretic terms, there may be
multiple equilibria – multiple possible agreements that both sides prefer to the status quo
– and states face the challenge of choosing among these many possible agreements.
Different terms of cooperation can have different distributive implications,
affecting states’ calculation of costs and benefits, both economically and politically. In
an international trade agreement, for example, one side may prefer to drastically reduce
tariffs on industrial goods, while another may place a stronger emphasis on reducing
agricultural tariffs or agricultural subsidies.

In this view, states face not only the

challenge of monitoring and enforcing compliance with a trade agreement, as in the PD
model, but also of deciding on the terms of cooperation. Yet PD models, with their
binary choice of cooperation or defection and their emphasis on Pareto-improving
outcomes, fail to capture these elements of international cooperation.
We therefore offer three specific, overlapping arguments that are most relevant to
international regulatory cooperation and the use of hard and soft law instruments toward
that end.
First, regime theory, with its emphasis on PD and collective-action models, has
under-emphasized both distributive conflict and the role of state power in determining the
77
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outcome of regulatory conflicts. This, in turn, has affected international law scholarship,
much of which has welcomed regime theory for its validation of international law’s role.
In international politics, as Stephen Krasner argues, efforts at cooperation often take the
form of a Battle of the Sexes game, in which different states have clear preferences for
different international standards.79 Even if all states benefit from a common standard,
raising the prospect of joint gains, the distribution of those gains depends on the specific
standard chosen, and the primary question is whether and how states can secure
cooperation on their preferred terms.
Put differently, Krasner argues, the most important question is not whether to
move toward the “Pareto frontier” of mutually beneficial cooperation, but which point on
the Pareto frontier will be chosen. Under such circumstances, he suggests, outcomes are
determined primarily by the use of state power, which may be employed in one of three
ways: (1) to determine who may play the game (regime membership); (2) to dictate the
rules of the game (or our purposes, whether through hard or soft law), including the
possibility of a single state moving first and imposing a de facto standard on others; and
(3) to employ issue-linkages, including through the application of threats and promises in
related issue-areas, to change the payoff matrix for other states and induce those states to
accept one’s preferred standards.80 Krasner views such coordination regimes as stable
and self-enforcing, yet this self-enforcing nature of the regime should not obscure the fact
that the regime produces winners (who secure cooperation on terms closer to their
preferences) and losers (forced to cooperate on terms favorable to others), and that state
power plays a key role in determining the shape of the regime and the standards adopted
under the regime.
We should, therefore, expect the outcome of a Battle of the Sexes game to be
determined in large part by powerful states, with weaker players being excluded from
79
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negotiations, or forced to accept a fait accompli, or induced to accept powerful states’
terms through threats and promises in related issue-areas. In the global regulatory
context, therefore, we would expect the United States and the European Union to play
dominant roles in bargaining, with smaller countries being placed in a difficult situation
when the US and the EU agree, as well as when they clash. When the US and EU agree,
smaller countries will be under considerable pressure to adapt to US and EU standards.
When the US and EU disagree, smaller countries may have a greater range of choices, on
the one hand, but they may face considerable countervailing pressures on the other,
caught between the US-EU conflict.
Second, distributive conflict is not unique to Battle of the Sexes games, but
emerges as a generic and nearly ubiquitous feature of all international cooperation. By
contrast with the approach of situation-structuralists in international relations theory who
distinguish among different types of game contexts,81 James Fearon has argued in a
landmark article that it is misleading to attempt to characterize international cooperation
over any given issue as either a Prisoners’ Dilemma or a Battle game. Rather, Fearon
maintains,
… understanding strategic problems of international cooperation as having a
common strategic structure is more accurate and perhaps more theoretically
fruitful. Empirically, there are always many possible ways to arrange an arms,
trade, financial or environmental treaty, and before states can cooperate to enforce
an agreement they must bargain to decide which one to implement.

Thus,

regardless of the substantive domain, problems of international cooperation
involve first a bargaining problem (akin to the various coordination games that
have been studied) and next an enforcement problem (akin to a Prisoners’
Dilemma game).82
More specifically, Fearon models international cooperation as a two-stage game in which
states first agree on the terms of cooperation, and then establish any monitoring and
81
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sanctioning provisions necessary for enforcement. Linking these two stages into a single
game provides useful insights into the significant challenges of successful international
cooperation.

For example, a long “shadow of the future” can lessen problems of

enforcement, by reassuring the players that the game is an iterated one and that
compliance will be rewarded and noncompliance punished over the long haul. By the
same token, however, a long shadow of the future can exacerbate distributional conflicts:
If states know that the rules and standards they adopt will bind them and their successors
for many years to come, they will have a greater incentive to bargain hard and to hold out
for their preferred standard, knowing that it can shape the patterns of gains and losses
well into the future.83 In this view, enforceable, hard law agreements may increase the
shadow of the future and hence make bargaining more difficult, whereas soft law
instruments may make enforcement more problematic but alleviate distributional
conflicts in bargaining.
Third, the setting of international regulatory standards is particularly prone to
distributive conflicts, and international standard setting can and should be theorized as a
coordination game that often creates incentives for parties to engage in strategic
bargaining.

Some standard-setting negotiations may take the form of a “pure

coordination” game, in which the various participants are entirely indifferent among the
possible standards to be adopted.84 Indeed, the constructivist or “world society” literature
depicts international standard setting as an essentially technocratic and deliberative
process in which calculations of interest and power recede into the background.85
However, as Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe have argued convincingly, almost any
potential international standard is likely to have varying distributive implications for
states and firms, and so we can expect actors to attempt to “export” their domestic
standards to the international level, minimizing their adaptation costs, while their trading
partners and competitors are forced to adapt and adjust to a new and different standard.86
Negotiating environmental, health and safety standards where they have significant trade
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implications, for example, can be particularly difficult because of the distributional
stakes.87

C. The Challenge of Fragmented Regime Conflicts
Thus far, we have argued that the making of international regulations, both hard
and soft, is likely to be characterized by sharp distributive conflict, with outcomes being
decided in large part by dominant economic powers such as the US and the EU. This
distributive conflict, we now argue, may take a distinctive form in issue-areas that are
characterized by a proliferation of hard and soft law rules and regimes. Preliminary
formulations of the concept of international regimes identified regimes by specific issueareas.88 Yet an increasing number of real-world problems do not fall neatly within the
jurisdiction of a single regime, but rather lie at the intersection of multiple regimes. These
overlapping regimes result in a regime complex, which Kal Raustiala and David Victor
have defined as: “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions
governing a particular issue-area.” As they state,

Regime complexes are marked by the existence of several legal agreements that
are created and maintained in distinct fora with participation of different sets of
actors. The rules in these elemental regimes functionally overlap, yet there is no
agreed upon hierarchy for resolving conflicts between rules.

Disaggregated

decision making in the international legal system means that agreements reached
in one forum do not automatically extend to, or clearly trump, agreements
developed in other forums.89

Decision-making in these regime complexes is characterized by several distinctive
features, of which we emphasize three in terms of their implications for hard and soft law
interaction.
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First, negotiations in a given regime will not begin with a blank slate but will
typically demonstrate “path dependence,” taking into account developments in related
international regimes, and, in particular for our purposes, the WTO-trade regime. Second,
individual states, responding to domestic political contexts and seeking to advance their
interests, will engage in “forum shopping,” selecting particular regimes that are most
likely to support their preferred outcomes. More specifically, states will select regimes
based on characteristics such as their membership (e.g., bilateral, restricted or universal),
voting rules (e.g. one-state-one-vote vs. weighted voting, and consensus vs. majority
voting), institutional characteristics (e.g., presence or absence of dispute-settlement
procedures), substantive focus (e.g. trade finance, environment or food safety), and
predominant functional representation (e.g. by trade, finance, environment or agricultural
ministries), each of which might be expected to influence substantive outcomes in more
or less predictable ways.90
Third, the dense array of institutions in a given regime complex will create legal
inconsistencies among them. States will respond to these inconsistencies with efforts
either to demarcate clear boundaries among various regimes, or to assert the primacy or
hierarchy of one regime over the others, in reflection of a state’s substantive preferences.
States may engage in “strategic inconsistency,” attempting through one regime to create
conflict or inconsistency in another in the hopes of shifting the understanding or actual
adaptation of the rules in that other regime in a particular direction. Powerful states are
likely to be particularly adept at such forum shopping.91
The political science analysis of overlapping regimes is complemented by a
growing legal literature about the “pluralism” and “fragmentation” of international law.92
In 2000, for example, the International Law Commission (ILC) included the topic “Risks
ensuing from the fragmentation of international law” into its work program, and in 2002
it created a Study Group to make recommendations concerning the topic, renamed
“Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and
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expansion of international law.”93 For many international lawyers, the result of such
fragmentation is legal uncertainty and potential conflict between international legal
regimes.94 As the 2006 ILC report states:

[W]hat once appeared to be governed by “general international law” has become
the field of operation for such specialist systems as “trade law,” “human rights
law,” “environmental law,” “law of the sea,” “European law”… each possessing
their own principles and institutions. The problem, as lawyers have seen it, is that
such specialized law-making and institution-building tends to take place with
relative ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in the adjoining fields
and of the general principles and practices of international law. The result is
conflicts between rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices and,
possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on the law.95

Scholars disagree regarding the causes of such fragmentation and whether
fragmentation is positive or negative for international law, but they largely concur on its
development.96 Many legal scholars view this development as a manifestation of the rise
of a global legal pluralism, which refers to “the presence in a social field of more than
one legal order.”97 As a theory or analytic framework, legal pluralism differs from much
of regime theory in that it challenges monist conceptions of the state and of state
interests, and rather emphasizes the interaction between distinct normative orders — state
and non-state — while deemphasizing the role of formal texts. In this sense, legal
pluralism has a “radically heterogeneous” conception of law and social order, taking a

93

International Law Commission 2006.
See e.g. Delmas-Marty 1998: 104 ; Dupuy 1999; Koskenniemi and Leinmo 2002; and Roberts 2004. On
the WTO and public international law, see Marceau 2001; and Pauwelyn 2003.
95
International Law Commission (ILC) 2006: 9.
96
Compare, on the one hand, Charney 1996 and Koskenniemi and Leinmo 2002 (both contending that a
positive development), and on the other, Benvenisti and Downs 2007 and Dupuy 1999 (contending that
problematic).
97
Griffiths 1986.
94

31
post-modernist, constructivist orientation that focuses on social diversity and informality
more than on formal rules and hierarchic authority.98
Although legal pluralism and theories of regime complexes have quite different
starting points, in particular regarding their conceptions of the role of states, they both
raise the question of how legal regimes interact and potentially constrain one another
where there is no central authority. As Roderick Macdonald writes from a legal pluralist
perspective, “[d]ifferent legal regimes are in constant interaction, mutually influencing
the emergence of each other’s rules, processes and institutions.”99 These regimes are not
“self-contained,”100 in a way that some positivist legal commentators fear, but rather
exercise normative pressure on each other, as we will demonstrate below. Lines of
communication between regimes exist, but, crucially, there is no hierarchy imposing a
particular discipline. We are interested in the interaction of “harder” and “softer” forms
of international law within a regime complex, which calls into question much of the
previous theorizing about them.

III. Hard and Soft Law Interaction as Antagonists

Having discussed the significance of distributive conflict and regime complexes
for international cooperation in general, we are now ready to return to the issue of how
hard and soft law interact in the international realm. We contend that careful scrutiny of
the interaction of hard and soft law instruments within a fragmented international law
system demonstrates that they are not necessarily mutually supportive, but also can
counteract and undermine each other under certain conditions.

More precisely,

individual states may deliberately use soft-law instruments to undermine hard-law rules
to which they object, or vice-versa, creating an antagonistic relationship between these
legal instruments. The scope conditions for such behavior, we argue, are determined by
the two factors discussed in the previous section, namely distributive conflict and regime
complexes. Where distributive conflict is low, we have argued, states are likely to utilize
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hard- and soft-law instruments selectively, adopting each type of instrument for its
relative strengths, and utilizing those instruments in a complementary fashion, i.e. with
soft law provisions either supplementing existing hard law or leading the way to new
hard law in an evolutionary process.

In situations of intense distributive conflict,

however, the content of international norms and rules are fundamentally contested by
states, which therefore have an incentive to use soft law to undermine hard law
provisions to which they object, and vice-versa. Put differently, distributive conflict
provides an incentive for states to contest, undermine, and possibly replace legal
provisions – hard and soft – to which they object.
Within a single international regime, states are likely to enjoy limited
opportunities to contest and undermine existing legal provisions, particularly if the new
provisions are enacted under a stable membership and institutional rules. In a fragmented
regime complex, however, the prospects for antagonistic interaction of hard and soft law
increase dramatically. Even in the absence of sharp distributive conflict among states,
different regimes are likely to be characterized by different memberships, decision rules,
and substantive foci, creating tensions and inconsistencies among both hard and soft
international norms and rules. These problems of coordination, however, are likely to be
magnified substantially insofar as states engage in distributive conflict over the content of
international regulations. In such instances, we may expect states to engage in the full
range of forum-shopping strategies discussed in the literature on regime complexes and
international law fragmentation, using hard or soft law provisions in favored regimes to
counter or undermine legal developments in neighboring regimes. Put differently, if
distributive conflicts provide states with an incentive to use hard and soft law instruments
strategically, the existence of international regime complexes increases their
opportunities to do so.
------------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------------------Our argument is summarized in Table 1, which illustrates our expectations about
the interaction of hard and soft law under different combinations of distributive conflict
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and regime complexes. Where distributive conflict is low and regimes can be easily
isolated, as in the upper left-hand cell, states have little incentive to undermine existing
law, and hard and soft law are likely to interact and evolve in complementary ways,
reflecting the existing literature. In the lower left-hand cell, we imagine a world in which
distributive conflict is again low, but regime complexes coexist with no hierarchical
structure, such as when an issue area comprises multiple functional domains. Here, we
would not expect states to actively contest or undermine existing legal provisions, but we
would anticipate some coordination problems among regimes with different
memberships, decision rules, and substantive foci.
Compare these two outcomes to those in the right-hand column, where
distributive conflict is high. Where states engage in distributive conflict within a single,
isolated regime, as in the upper-right cell, states will have an incentive to undermine
existing legal provisions, but their opportunities for doing so will be limited, in particular
because most international organizations operate by consensus decision-making so that
any state benefiting from existing law could block adoption of countervailing legal
instruments.101 In fact, however, we would expect this scenario to be relatively rare, for
the simple reason that distributive conflict among states provides a strong incentive for
states that are dissatisfied with a given regime to press for the creation or development of
new regimes to compete with or undermine existing regimes, particularly insofar as the
existing regime is resistant to change. Put differently, the choice to create new regimes
is, at least in part, endogenous to the presence of distributive conflict, which would tend
to push outcomes from the upper right-hand cell to the lower right-hand cell, where
distributive conflicts are present and multiple regimes overlap in a single issue-area. In
such cases, we argue, states enjoy both an incentive and an opportunity to act
strategically, by forum shopping, favoring some regimes over others, and using hard- and
soft-law instruments to advocate their preferred norms and rules and undermine those to
which they are opposed.
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In such settings, we can imagine multiple combinations of overlapping and
competing hard- and soft- law regimes asserting jurisdiction over a given issue. For a
state that is certain of its interests and intent on undermining an existing regime, for
example, new hard law provisions would most likely be preferable, ceteris paribus, and
we find some examples of states establishing such conflicting hard-law regimes below. In
practice, however, states often choose instruments of a relatively softer law nature to
counter existing hard law, as our examples will show. We can imagine several reasons
for such a choice. One explanation may be that states do not wish to counter existing
hard law directly for systemic reasons, but rather prefer to soften it indirectly, such as
through affecting the interpretation of the existing hard law, and thus its precision and
clarity. Thus, even when states choose a formally hard law instrument, the instrument
may be soft along the dimension of delegation in order to avoid two judicial bodies
pronouncing on a single issue in distinct regimes. Another explanation may be that the
existing hard law is of a broad scope of coverage, such as the rules of the World Trade
Organization, so that states do not wish to undermine the overall system, but merely
affect the operation of some legal provisions within the existing regime.

Another

explanation may be, from a constructivist perspective, that the existing hard law exercises
some normative pull so that states find it difficult to find a sufficient number of allied
states to enter into a new hard law instrument that directly counters the existing one.
Finally, it may be that some (revisionist) states, dissatisfied with existing regimes, do
indeed press for conflicting hard law provisions, but are unable to secure the agreement
of other (status-quo) parties on such provisions, and fall back on soft law agreements as a
second-best alternative.
Regardless of the specific combinations of hard and soft law provisions, our
central point is that, in the presence of distributive conflict and fragmented regime
complexes, the interaction of hard and soft law is likely to be not complementary but
antagonistic, with the strengths of each regime being undermined through such
interaction.

In such a setting, we contend, soft law provisions are likely to be

“hardened,” losing many of the purported advantages of soft law such as experimentation
and flexibility as a result of their link to hard law regimes. Hard law provisions, by
contrast, may be “softened,” as states, international courts and tribunals are increasingly
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forced to weigh the black-letter provisions of one regime against the competing
normative provisions of neighboring regimes. This scenario, moreover, is more than
simply a theoretical possibility: If distributive conflict over the terms of cooperation is
ubiquitous, as we have argued above, and if a given issue is subject to multiple regimes in
the ever-thickening web of international norms, rules, and institutions, then we may
expect hard and soft law to interact antagonistically across a broad range of issues in
international politics. To illustrate this argument empirically, we begin in this section
with the case of agricultural biotechnology, an area of international regulation that has
been subject to both distributional conflict and a well-developed regime complex, before
moving in Part IV to articulate additional hypotheses and examine a range of additional
empirical cases.
As we have demonstrated at length elsewhere, the US and EU have taken sharply
divergent approaches to the regulation of agricultural biotechnology.102 Simplifying only
slightly, the United States has, since the 1980s, adopted a set of regulations that treated
genetically modified (GM) foods as largely equivalent to their conventional counterparts,
which contributed in turn to the early adoption of agricultural biotechnology by US firms
and farmers. In the European Union, by contrast, regulators and publics have taken a far
more cautious approach to genetically modified organisms (GMOs), treating genetically
modified foods and crops as different from their conventional counterparts, and adopting
increasingly strict and complex regulatory procedures for their approval and marketing.
Unlike in the United States, GM foods and crops face considerable regulatory hurdles in
the EU, including requirements for mandatory pre-approval of all GM products, as well
as provisions on the mandatory labeling and traceability of all GM products, which have
made it difficult and sometimes impossible for US farmers to export genetically modified
foods to markets in Europe. They also face greater social resistance, with activists
campaigning against GM foods and ripping up GM crops from fields, and public opinion
far more mobilized over GM foods than in the United States. Reflecting this “regulatory
polarization,” US and EU negotiators have demonstrated sharply divergent preferences
over global GMO regulation, with each side consistently seeking to export its own
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approach to the global level. The level of distributive conflict in this area is, therefore,
high.
This transatlantic dispute over GMO regulation, moreover, has played out against
the backdrop of a regime complex comprising both soft law regimes, including the nonbinding guidelines and recommendations issued by the OECD and Codex, alongside
regimes having more hard law characteristics, such as the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol
and the World Trade Organization, the latter of which combines relatively detailed,
legally binding rules with a particularly strong system of third-party dispute settlement to
interpret and enforce them. In this setting, both the US and the EU have attempted to
export their different approaches to various international regimes, engaging in “forumshopping” to find particularly hospitable regimes, and producing awkward compromises
within, as well as inconsistencies among, various international regimes. In the process,
soft and hard law mechanisms have not interacted in a complementary and progressive
manner, as theorized in the existing literature, but rather served to constrain and undercut
each other. More flexible soft law regimes like the Codex Alimentarius Commission
have been “hardened” by concerns over the implications of their decisions in the hard law
WTO regime, while the hard law WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Standards (SPS Agreement) has been “softened,” being made more flexible and less
predictable as the WTO judicial process has sought means to avoid deciding the
substantive issues in dispute.
Let us explain how this has worked in some detail. The existing WTO regime
favors the US position that any import restrictions of genetically modified (GM) products
must be based on a scientific risk assessment, even if the regulatory restrictions apply
equally to domestically produced and imported products. From the perspective of the EU,
the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), one of a series of framework agreements
adopted at the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, offered a promising alternative forum for the regulation of GM products. In
particular, it offered a forum within which the EU could press for an international
environmental agreement supporting its precautionary approach to biotech regulation.
Thanks to EU entrepreneurship, countries adopted a new Biosafety Protocol to the CBD
in September 2003, which had been ratified by over 140 parties by early 2008.
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The United States attempted to block adoption of the Protocol but was
unsuccessful. The US nonetheless actively participated in the negotiations, including over
the drafting of a provision governing the relationship of the Biosafety Protocol to the
WTO agreements. The US demanded a “savings clause” to preserve WTO rights because
otherwise there would be an argument under international law that conflicting provisions
in a treaty signed last in time prevail over those in a prior treaty (known as lex
posteriori).103 The US obtained such a clause, but it failed to obtain a clear reservation of
its WTO rights.104 Rather, references to other “international agreements” were only made
in the Protocol’s preamble, and these references are in tension with each other. The
preamble provides that “this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the
rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements.” The next
phrase, however, states that “the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol
to other international agreements.” As an EU representative stated, the two clauses
effectively “cancel each other out,” leaving the legal relationship between the two
regimes unclear and allowing both sides to claim a partial victory.105 The EU, therefore,
could point to the Biosafety Protocol as evidence of an international consensus (involving
over 140 parties). It could (and did) modify its existing legislation to comply with its
international commitments under the Biosafety Protocol, pointing to these international
obligations in its defense against the United States’ WTO challenge to the EU’s biotech
regime in 2003. From a legal positivist perspective, the Biosafety Protocol is a form of
“hard” law as its rules are binding on the parties to it, but it is “softer” than the WTO
regime along a hard-soft law continuum, since third-party dispute settlement is not
central to its operation.
Overall, the EU has found a more favorable forum in the Biosafety Protocol to
fashion international rules and norms that contain its “fingerprints,” coinciding with and
supporting its regulatory approach to agricultural biotechnology. In particular, the
Protocol has created new rules providing for the application of the precautionary
principle in national decision-making, and the requirement of labeling of Living Modified
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Organisms (LMOs) in conformity with an importing country’s requirements. In addition,
discussion continues regarding risk assessment and risk management principles,
including the taking into account of “socio-economic considerations” in regulatory
approvals, as well as liability rules. In this way, the Protocol serves as a counterweight to
the WTO SPS Agreement’s narrower focus on science-based justifications for SPS
measures affecting trade.
Both the US and EU also attempted to export their policies to a third organization,
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), an intergovernmental body established in
1962 by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health
Organization (WHO) to facilitate international trade in food through the adoption of
international food-safety standards, which consisted of 178 members by early 2008.
Traditionally the US and EU have driven Codex agendas and still do so to a large extent.
Each works to find allies for its own positions.
Codex traditionally represented a form of soft law, since the standards were not
binding and, by definition, there was no need for a dispute settlement system to enforce
them.106 The process for producing Codex standards involves committees of experts
which are established to deliberate over the appropriate standards. A designated Codex
committee elaborates a draft standard or guideline subject to comments by member
governments and interested international organizations. Once the process is completed,
standards are approved by the full Codex Alimentarius Commission, which meets once
every two years.
Overall, Codex became a sort of gentleman’s club – or epistemic community – of
food specialists, based on the following characteristics:

“(1) the position of Codex as relatively isolated from international hard
law and politics, (2) the voluntary nature of Codex activities and output,
(3) agreed-upon norms, which restrained members from both obstructing
the process of elaborating new Codex standards and from letting trade
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considerations override all other considerations, and (4) lack of sanctions
in situations where [standards are] not followed.”107

Those attending Codex meetings were (and the majority remain) food safety experts,
often with technical scientific backgrounds from national administrations and industry.108
Although only governments can vote, the process has often been driven by industry,
which seeks to reduce compliance costs resulting from multiple national regulations.
The situation of the Codex, however, changed considerably with the creation of
the WTO and the adoption of the SPS Agreement in 1995. Under the WTO’s SPS
Agreement, implementation of a Codex standard creates a presumption of compliance
with “harder” WTO law provisions, subject to binding dispute settlement. More
precisely, article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that WTO members shall base their
food safety standards on international standards, guidelines and recommendations
(specifying those of Codex), subject to certain exceptions. Article 3.2 further states that a
member’s conformity with these international standards shall be presumed to comply
with WTO law. These SPS provisions have significantly increased the significance of
Codex standards, providing a significant impetus to harmonization activities, but also
“hardening” Codex decision-making by providing US and EU negotiators with an
incentive both to export and to protect their respective regulatory standards.
The effect of Codex standards became clear in the US-EU trade dispute over the
EU’s ban on beef produced with growth hormones. In 1995, at the first Codex session
following the creation of the WTO, the United States strategically “forced a vote and the
adoption of Codex standards” covering five bovine growth hormones, winning the vote
by a 33-29 margin, with seven abstentions.109 It was hardly a consensus decision, but it
was enough to establish a “voluntary” international Codex standard under the
organization’s voting rules. Shortly afterwards, the U.S. initiated its WTO complaint
against the EU, contending that the EU’s ban was not “based” on an international
(Codex) standard as required by the SPS Agreement.
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Since then, the United States and European countries have placed increasing
importance on the negotiation of new regulatory principles and standards within Codex,
since these principles and standards may be invoked (and already have been invoked) in
the decisions of WTO panels and of the Appellate Body. As a European Commission
representative before Codex concludes, “In the past, if we disagreed with Codex
standards or Code of Practice, we could ignore it and take our own legislation. Now we
can’t.”110 In response, states began sending more than food experts and food agency
officials to Codex meetings, complementing them with “delegates from the diplomatic
services and ministries of trade, industry, finance, and foreign affairs.” In an empirical
study, Veggeland and Borden note an increase of such representatives to the Codex
Committee on General Principles from 10 in 1992, to 32 in 2000, to 41 in 2001.111
The Codex process has encountered particularly severe difficulties in addressing
issues that implicate risk management policy over transgenic varieties. Three Codex subgroups have addressed them: the Committee on General Principles (regarding the use of
the precautionary principle and “other legitimate factors” besides science in risk
management); the Committee on Labeling (regarding the labeling of GM foods); and the
Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems (regarding
the issue of traceability). Here, we find arduous negotiations between the US and EU,
each of which put forward distinctive and sharply opposed proposals for international
standards and guidelines on issues that could have a direct bearing on the application of
the SPS Agreement to national regulatory measures, and in particular in the WTO biotech
case that the US initiated in 2003, resulting in deadlock in the soft law Codex regime.112
The results of these negotiations in the purportedly soft law Codex forum have
not produced consensus. Like the paragraphs of the Cartagena Protocol dealing with the
relation between Cartagena and WTO law, much of these Codex texts simply paper over
rather than settle the differences among the parties, potentially delegating clarification of
these issues, if at all, to the WTO dispute settlement system. Rather than hard law and
soft law working in coordination toward genuine “problem-solving,” the hard law of the
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WTO has constrained and to some extent “hardened” what was supposed to be a flexible,
“voluntary” process for harmonized rule-making and guidance to facilitate trade in
agricultural products. Strategic bargaining in defense of trade interests has often replaced
technical discussions. As Victor writes, we are now more likely to see “dueling experts,”
reflecting US adversarial legalism, than “independent expert panels” working
collaboratively to “synthesize complex technical information.”113 As Veggeland and
Borgen add, we now see a “replication of WTO coalition[s] and positioning pattern[s] in
the Codex.”114 An organization in which decision-making was formerly based primarily
on a “logic of arguing” based on deliberation has been transformed to one more
frequently based on a “logic of consequentiality” based on bargaining.
The United States was concerned with the spread of regulation in other countries
restricting the growth and sale of GM products, which was spurred and legitimated by the
Biosafety Protocol. In response, the United States finally brought a WTO complaint
against EU regulatory measures in 2003, which the US hoped would have significant
implications for other countries’ practices. After considerable delay, the WTO disputesettlement panel finally issued its decision in September 2006. The underlying conflict
over the conflicting US and EU regulatory approaches, however, arguably affected the
panel’s decision. The impact of the panel’s decision would be felt outside the trade
regime, in both domestic law and politics and in the international regimes regulating
other aspects of agricultural biotechnology. As a result, we contend, the WTO hard law
dispute settlement system adopted a cautious approach in its interpretation and
application of the SPS Agreement, providing less clarity as to members’ SPS
commitments, arguably reducing their credibility. In effect, we argue, the linkage of the
agricultural biotechnology issue to other substantive regimes helped to “soften” the effect
of WTO hard law, which lost several of the defining characteristics of hard law in
practice. As a result, we find that the SPS Agreement was effectively made less binding
in practice in this case, for reasons that we now explain.
Even though the panel’s decision weighed in at over one thousand pages of text,
the panel expressly avoided examining many crucial issues, most particularly the
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questions “whether biotech products in general are safe or not” and “whether the biotech
products at issue in this dispute are ‘like’ their conventional counterparts.” The panel did
find in favor of the United States, but largely on procedural and not substantive grounds,
with less hard law substantive bite. As a result, the substantive outcome and application
of SPS rules remain unclear. As regards measures adopted at the EU level, the panel only
found that the EU had engaged in “undue delay” in its approval process. The panel found
that because of this delay, the EU had never taken an actual “SPS measure.” On these
grounds, the panel did not examine the EU’s actions under the SPS Agreement’s
substantive provisions. It thus avoided determining whether the EU had violated its
obligation to base a decision on a risk assessment, or whether any assessments showed
greater risks of GM varieties than for conventional plant varieties, or whether the EU was
consistent in its application of food safety regulations, or whether the EU could adopt
regulations that are less-trade restrictive while accomplishing its safety objectives.
Regarding safeguards enacted by EU member states, in contrast, the panel found that all
of them were “SPS measures” that violated the EU’s substantive obligations under article
5.1 of the SPS Agreement because they were “not based on a risk assessment.”
However, the panel only reached this conclusion by looking to risk assessments already
conducted at the EU level, finding that the member-state bans were inconsistent with the
EU’s internal risk assessment findings.
Even though the WTO biotech panel found that the Biosafety Protocol’s
provisions did not apply because the United States is not a party to the Protocol, panelists
can implicitly take the Protocol into account. They can do so through their appreciation
of the political stakes of alternative interpretations of WTO rules (from a rationalist
perspective), and through the Protocol’s impact on the framing and broader social
understanding of the issues (from a constructivist one). The existence of the Protocol can
affect the interpretation of WTO legal provisions and the appreciation of the underlying
facts of the case to which WTO law is applied. Moreover, it is simply not in the interest
of the WTO as an organization to ignore the content of an international environmental
agreement, especially one having over 140 parties.

In the context of agricultural

biotechnology regulation, the CBD’s Biosafety Protocol has created normative pressure
for a WTO panel not to be too demanding on the risk assessment requirement.
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WTO judges, both panelists and the members of the Appellate Body, have some
independent agency. They are not only interpreters and appliers of WTO legal provisions.
The pattern of their jurisprudence suggests that they also assume a mediating role. The
WTO Appellate Body and judicial panels at times have an incentive to write opinions that
are slightly ambiguous, leading to different interpretations as to how they can be
implemented. In this way, they can shape their decisions, especially in hard cases, to
facilitate amicable settlement, and thereby uphold the WTO legal system from normative
challenge.
In doing so, however, they render the WTO’s hard law text less clear, and thus
less binding in practice. For example, through finding that neither the EU general nor
product-specific moratoria were “SPS measures,” the panel left a WTO decision over the
crucial substantive issue of whether EU-level decision-making was based on a scientific
risk assessment for another day. As regards the member state safeguard measures, the
panel found that they were inconsistent with the EU’s substantive WTO commitments to
base SPS measures on a risk assessment, but did so by relying on risk assessments
conducted by the EU itself. The panel even indicated a means for the EU to comply with
SPS requirements, including for member state safeguards, in a manner that would
enhance EU discretion.115 The panel decision was not unique to the GMO case. As we
have discussed elsewhere, even before the panel’s GMO decision, the jurisprudence of
the Appellate Body indicated a willingness to provide significant discretion to domestic
regulators regarding SPS measures.116
Under the panel’s reasoning, only once the EU actually makes a decision which
results in an “SPS measure” regarding a GM variety may a complainant bring a
substantive claim. In such case, the complainant would have to restart the process from
scratch. A panel would have to be formed and experts consulted. The actual delay in the
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panel making a decision on the substance of EU decision-making will thus be much
longer than the three and half years that the case formally took (not to count subsequent
procedures regarding the EU’s implementation of the ruling), if indeed a new claim is
ever filed. The panel thereby effectively parried deciding on the substance of EU
decision-making. The panel’s delay can be viewed in socio-legal terms. The panel was
not anxious to make a substantive decision on EU procedures regarding the politically
controversial issue of GMOs, resulting in a softening of the binding nature of the WTO
commitments in question.117
In sum, the intense politicization of the issue, and the entrenchment of two
sharply divergent regulatory systems governing the world’s two largest economies meant
that the various multilateral negotiations on agricultural biotechnology resembled a Battle
of the Sexes game, in which each side sought common international standards on its own
terms. These various regimes have interacted, but the result has been some “hardening”
of the soft law regimes like Codex, and to some “softening” (and more flexibility and less
predictability) of the hard law WTO dispute-settlement system. The Codex has lost some
of its traditional advantages as a soft law regime, growing more contentious, more
difficult, and less deliberative over time because states are concerned about how its
decisions can be used in the hard law WTO dispute-settlement system. By contrast, the
quintessential hard law regime of the WTO dispute settlement system has been softened
somewhat, as panelists and Appellate Body members need to take into account not only
political pressures from the member states, but also the growing overlaps, tensions, and
conflicts between the WTO legal order and the provisions – both hard and soft – of
neighboring international regimes.

IV. Hypotheses as to the Interaction of Hard and Soft Law Instruments

As we have now shown, although hard and soft law mechanisms can complement
each other, they do not necessarily interact in a complementary, mutually reinforcing
manner. We advance three hypotheses as to how these tools operate in international
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governance. In each case, we refer to policy examples. We offer these arguments as
conjectures subject to further testing.
1. Where the US and EU agree on a regulatory approach, we are more likely to
see hard and soft law work as complements in an evolutionary manner.
Because of US and EU collective market power, where the US and EU agree on a
policy, it is much easier for them to promote it globally. As Richard Steinberg writes
regarding the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, for example, “[f]rom the time the
transatlantic powers agreed to [a common] approach in 1990, they definitively dominated
the agenda-setting process, that is, the formulation and drafting of texts that would be
difficult to amend.”118
We have seen many examples of this process.119 One side may initially be the
primary entrepreneur behind the international regulatory initiative, eventually bringing
the other side on board. The US has often taken the lead in initiatives that have resulted
in successful international regulatory cooperation, from international agreements to
protect the ozone layer to the anti-bribery convention to the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations. In both the ozone protection and anti-bribery cases, the initial instruments
were of a soft law nature, and hard law agreements were reached once EU members were
convinced of the benefits of a hard law approach.

Yet with the increased

institutionalization and harmonization of European regulation at the EU level, the EU
may likewise play an increasingly important entrepreneurial role in global governance.120
Generally speaking, the success of international endeavors, from the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), to the Basel Committee, to the export
credit soft law arrangement, depends on the cooperation of the US and the EU or its
members.121 Indeed, we suggest that much of the existing literature on the
complementary interaction of hard and soft law exhibits selection bias by drawing
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disproportionately from cases in which the US and EU agree on the aims and terms of
regulation because there are no, or only minimal distributive conflicts between them.

2. Where the US and EU disagree on a regulatory approach, i.e., where there are
distributive conflicts between them, we are more likely to see hard and soft law work in
opposition to each other, especially where the issue in question is governed by multiple,
overlapping regimes. Given the fragmented nature of the international system, the US
and EU will attempt to advance their interests in those regimes – both hard and soft law
– that they find to be most favorable to their respective positions.
Given the relatively equal economic power of the US and EU, where the two sides
disagree on a policy position, they are relatively well-positioned to use their market
power to offset each other’s efforts to export their own regulatory practices to the
international level. In these struggles, they look for allies to advance their aims, whether
in an existing forum or a new one. In many cases, the result of US-EU conflict will be
either international instruments containing general language that does not take a position
either way or competing international hard or soft law instruments. For example,
competition law is an area where the US and EU often have convergent policies and the
sides have collaborated in a soft law International Competition Network in promoting
competition law globally. However, the US and EU disagree regarding the appropriate
policies toward dominant firms, reflected in their different approaches to Microsoft’s
policies. As a result, the International Competition Network working group efforts on
single firm dominance have resulted in recommendations that are at a high degree of
generality because of disagreements between the US and Europe on these issues. 122
We have shown how the US and EU have attempted to export their policy
approaches in the area of agriculture biotechnology to different international regimes.
Although the US formally won the WTO case, it has often appeared that the EU has been
winning the struggle on the ground, since most countries signed the new Biosafety
Protocol and have begun to implement domestic legislation to restrict the import and
production of GM products, and to create stringent labeling requirements. However, the
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US has actively provided technical assistance around the world to develop local
constituencies for the promotion of agricultural biotech. The US has been somewhat
successful as plantings have rapidly risen in the largest developing countries, and in
particular in China, India, Brazil and Argentina.123 A number of these countries are
members of the Biosafety Protocol. Efforts under the Protocol to adopt more stringent
labeling requirements have run into obstacles in the last years, as agricultural ministries
have realized the potential impact of these requirements on agricultural trade.124 In the
case of voluntary soft law-making in Codex, the US-EU conflict regarding risk
management policies has given rise to hard bargaining resulting either in no agreement
or, where some agreement is reached, in general compromise language that papers over
the US-EU differences.
We posit that the tension among international regimes will generally apply in
trade and social policy issues where the US and EU take divergent positions, and that the
WTO will lie at the center of inter-regime conflicts given its broad scope of coverage and
its implications because of its hard law dispute settlement system.125 We provide a
second example here. The US and EU have long taken different positions regarding the
regulation of trade in cultural products, and in particular films and other media. This
issue was particularly contentious during the Uruguay Round in which the EU pushed for
an express “cultural exception,” while the US pressed for the liberalization of national
policies.126 Neither side was fully successful. The 1995 WTO General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) provides that countries are not bound to open their markets to
audiovisual services unless they make express commitments, but it set up a framework
for future negotiations that could lead to such liberalization, and the US was able to
obtain commitments from some WTO members. The US ultimately failed, however, to
obtain any EU commitments to open its market to audiovisual services under the
GATS.127
The EU then turned to a more favorable forum to advance its interests, the United
Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
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Council of Europe adopted a declaration on cultural diversity. This European declaration
helped to pave the way, in 2001, for UNESCO’s adoption of a Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity, a soft law instrument. UNESCO then turned to the drafting of a
binding convention, the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions, which 148 countries signed in October 2005. Only two countries
opposed it, the United States and Israel. The United States “vehemently opposed” the
convention throughout the negotiations, maintaining that it was protectionist and
inappropriately implicated UNESCO in trade policy.128 The convention went into effect
in March 2007.
Although the convention is formally binding, its core provisions are defensive.
As Christophe Beat Graber writes, “the principal role of the [Convention] will be to act as
a counterpart to the WTO whenever conflicts between trade and culture arise.”129 Article
1(g) of the convention, for example, provides that one of its objectives is “to give
recognition to the distinctive nature of cultural activities, goods and services as vehicles
of identity, values and meaning” — as opposed to having value only in economic terms.
Article 5 of the convention then affirms the sovereign right of the parties “to formulate
and implement their cultural polices and to adopt measures to protect and promote the
diversity of cultural expressions and to strengthen international cooperation to achieve
[such] purposes.” Article 6 provides that each party “may adopt measures aimed at
protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions within its territory,”
including “financial assistance” and other “regulatory measures.” Article 8 goes further,
maintaining that, “Parties may take all appropriate measures to protect and preserve
cultural expressions in situations [where cultural expressions are] in need of urgent
safeguarding.”
Much of the rest of the convention is of a soft law nature. In contrast to its
recognition of parties’ rights, the convention only creates soft law obligations, such as for
parties to further public awareness of cultural diversity’s importance (article 10), to
acknowledge civil society’s role (article 11) and to generally exercise their “best efforts”
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to implement the convention through cultural policy measures.130 The convention
provides for dispute settlement, but it too is of a soft law nature, relying on negotiation,
mediation and conciliation.131

The conciliation system, moreover, is non-binding, and

parties may also opt out of it.
A key issue thus became the relationship of the convention to other international
treaties, and particularly the WTO agreements.

The convention provides another

example of strategic ambiguity in this respect. Article 20 of the convention states that,
“without subordinating this convention to any other treaty,” the parties “shall foster
mutual supportiveness” with other treaties and “take into account the relevant provisions”
of the convention “when interpreting and applying … other treaties” and “when entering
into other international obligations.” At the same time, the article provides that “nothing
in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and obligations of the Parties
under any other treaties to which they are parties.”
Article 20’s focus on the fostering of “mutual supportiveness” among treaty
regimes can be read as an attempt to soften WTO rules to accommodate the convention’s
norms. The EU and other parties to the convention can now refer to an international
convention that expressly notes their sovereign rights under international law to take
measures, including trade measures, to protect their cultural diversity. As the number of
countries ratifying the convention grows, the convention, together with the 2001
UNESCO Universal Declaration, could be viewed as emerging customary international
law which applies to all nations except those non-signatories who persistently object to
it.132
The UNESCO convention could thus have an impact on future WTO negotiations
and on future WTO cases involving cultural products, even where they involve a WTO
member that is not a party to it. The UNESCO convention can be used, in particular, to
attempt to constrain WTO jurisprudence so that WTO panels interpret WTO rules in a
manner that treads lightly in this area, with the result that the application of WTO
agreements to cultural products will be softened.

Article XX(f) of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, for example, creates an exception to
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GATT obligations where a measure is “imposed for the protection of national treasures of
artistic, historic or archaeological value,” and Article XX(a) does the same for measures
“to protect public morals.” The interpretation of these or other GATT provisions could
be influenced by the UNESCO convention, creating greater uncertainty as to the extent of
WTO commitments as regards cultural products.
In sum, in this case as in the case of agricultural biotechnology regulation, the
potential link between the UNESCO cultural regime and the WTO trade regime, together
with the stark distributive differences between the US and the EU, have led to a
“hardening” of bargaining over the UNESCO convention, and could, in time, produce a
softening of WTO jurisprudence in this area.

3. Even where the US and EU agree on a regulatory approach, smaller states can
use hard and soft law strategies to attempt to thwart US and EU aims, again choosing
regimes more favorable to their positions in a fragmented international system.
However, the US and EU have significant advantages because of their market power and
resources.
The US and EU are not the only actors that can engage in strategies of deliberate
countering of one hard or soft law instrument through activities in a separate regime
resulting in distinct hard and soft law instruments. International law can also have
distributional implications for developing countries, with intellectual property law being
a prime example.133 In their article on regime complexes, Raustiala and Victor show how
the US and EU leveraged market power in trade negotiations under the Uruguay Round
to create new rules under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) which were closely modeled on US or EU law, requiring the
recognition of intellectual property rights in plant varieties.

Developing countries

responded by attempting to reframe intellectual property protection in light of
environmental and development goals under the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity. Their
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efforts led to a 2002 Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (PGR), which partly undercuts
TRIPS rules.134
Laurence Helfer has also explored how developing countries “engage in regime
shifting,” adopting “the tools of soft lawmaking.”135 In doing so, they often work with
non-governmental groups who serve as allies to help generate counter norms that are
development-oriented.136

Helfer shows how developing countries have attempted to

counter the creation of hard intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement and
bilateral TRIPS-plus agreements through forum-shifting tactics involving the CBD,
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Health Organization
(WHO).

They have attempted to do so regarding an array of issues involving

biodiversity, plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, public health, and human
rights. They aim to generate “new principles, norms and rules of intellectual property”
within these institutions which “are more closely aligned with these countries’
interests.”137

For example, the Conference of the Parties to the CBD has created

workshops, established working groups and developed guidelines to address the issues of
indigenous knowledge and the sharing of benefits from the use of genetic resources.138
Concurrent efforts within the FAO gave rise to the 2002 Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources (PGR) which recognizes “farmers rights,” “sovereign rights” over plant
genetic

resources,

and

equitable

“sharing

of

the

benefits

arising

from

commercialization.”139 This treaty constitutes hard law in that it is formally binding,

although it is much weaker than the TRIPS Agreement in its dispute settlement
provisions. Once again, countries have engaged in strategic ambiguity in defining the
PGR Treaty’s relation to the TRIPS Agreement.
Eyal Benvinisti and George Downs nonetheless question the efficacy of these
strategies.140

They contend that powerful countries are best able to make use of

fragmented international regimes through forum-shopping strategies to shape
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international law over time. They find that fragmented regime complexes increase the
transaction costs for participants, favoring those with greater resources. They argue that
“creating institutions along narrow functionalist lines … limits the opportunities that
weaker states have to build cross-issue coalitions that could potentially increase their
bargaining power and influence.”141

The counter-regimes mentioned by Helfer, for

example, are soft law regimes compared to the TRIPS Agreement, and weaker states
have adopted tactics that are primarily reactive in these soft law venues. Benvinisti and
Downs note, in particular, how “serial bilateralism is being used with increasing
frequency by powerful states to shape the evolution of norms in areas such as intellectual
property protection and drug pricing where they have vital interests at stake and where
their position on issues is far different from those of the vast majority of states.”142 These
bilateral agreements constitute hard law along all three dimensions defined by Abbot and
Snidal. Benvinisti and Downs find a similar process in the negotiation of investment
protections through bilateral investment treaties.143 The earlier failure of developing
countries to create a “new international economic order” in the 1970s, including through
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development as a rival institution to the
GATT, suggests that there are severe limits to weaker countries’ use of this option.144

V. Conclusions

Taken together, our hypotheses suggest that hard and soft law may interact in a
complementary and evolutionary fashion, as predicted in the canonical literature, but only
under certain conditions. Specifically, where the US and the EU, as the dominant
players in global regulation, agree on the aims and terms of regulation, soft and hard law
may complement each other in the ways discussed by Abbott and Snidal, Shelton, and
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others, so as to promote greater [regulatory] cooperation. However, in the absence of
such an agreement, or in the presence of distributive conflict between the US and the EU
and third countries, we can predict, and indeed we have seen in several concrete
instances, that states will strategically use different hard and soft law regimes to advance
their respective aims in the international arena. In these cases, hard and soft law regimes
may be placed in active opposition to each other, with soft law regimes taking on the
“hard bargaining” characteristics of hard law regimes, while the terms of hard law
regimes may become increasingly flexible, uncertain and “soft,” insofar as policymakers
and adjudicators tread softly in deciding cases with implications in neighboring regimes.
None of our analysis is to suggest that either hard or soft law is inherently flawed
or not worth pursuing. Where the scope conditions are right, hard and soft law can
interact productively, as discussed above. Furthermore, even where particular issues are
characterized by distributive conflicts and fragmented international regimes, both hard
and soft law regimes can play a positive role in encouraging cooperation, provided that
our expectations of these regimes remain realistic.

Even in these situations, while

regimes can be expected to lose some of their traditional law advantages — such as
flexibility and deliberative, technocratic decision-making in soft law regimes and legal
certainty in hard law regimes — they nevertheless offer useful fora in which states may
bargain over the adoption of international standards and attempt to address their
implications. More generally, multilateral regimes, while subject to distributive conflicts
and to forum-shopping and inconsistency across regimes, can still provide their
traditional functions of lowering the transaction costs of negotiations, providing a
common vocabulary for the parties, clarifying at least some of the mutual understandings
and obligations of the parties, and contributing to regulatory capacity building in lessdeveloped countries.145
In addition, we suggest, tensions and even conflicts among hard and soft
international law regimes should not necessarily be lamented. The tensions we observe
simply reflect underlying differences among states and state constituencies, and in
particular among powerful ones, in a diverse, pluralist world. In such a context,
overlapping, fragmented regimes can also provide a service to each other, signaling states
145
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and international decision-makers to tread softly in applying their particular rules, taking
account of developments in other spheres of international law and politics.146

For

example, they can prompt internal responses within the WTO regime to preserve its own
political legitimacy. In the context of agricultural biotechnology regulation, the CBD’s
Biosafety Protocol has provided a counter-voice which can protect the WTO system from
the WTO dispute settlement system’s relative insularity from global politics. These
agreements, we contend, will interact, and over time, they can operate recursively. In
doing so, they can help stabilize conflict and reduce the likelihood of trade wars. They
can also facilitate states’ mutual accommodation of regulatory difference at least to a
greater extent than in the absence of such institutions.
Ultimately, we contend, the relationship between international hard law and soft
law instruments cannot be characterized in a universal or invariant fashion. Rather, we
have argued, the interaction of hard and soft law depends in the first instance on the
broader context of international cooperation, including the respective power of the key
players, the degree of distributive conflict among them, the constellation and character of
regimes within a given regime complex, and the distinct politics of implementation. The
canonical, complementary and evolutionary relationship between hard and soft law is not
a myth, we maintain, but that relationship holds only under a set of scope conditions,
including broad agreement between the US and the EU on the aims and terms of
international law. Where these conditions fail to hold, the interaction between hard and
soft law can be far more adversarial than the canonical literature suggests. Understanding
the varied interactions of hard and soft law in a wider set of cases, we believe, represents
the next major challenge in this field of study.
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Table 1: Distributive Conflict, Regime Complexes, and
The Interaction of Hard and Soft Law

Single, Isolated Regime

Regime Complex

Dist. Conflict Low
Complementary interaction
of hard and soft law, as per
existing literature.

Possible complementary
interaction of hard and soft
law, although differing
memberships, rules and
substantive foci may render
coordination difficult even
in the absence of major
distributive conflicts.

Dist. Conflict High
Possible antagonistic
interaction of hard and soft
law within the regime,
although opportunities
limited by invariant
memberships, rules, and
substantive content of
regime.
Likely antagonistic
interaction of hard and soft
law between regimes with
different decision-making
rules, memberships and
substantive foci.
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